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Don't you push me, push me, push me
Don't you push me down.'

INTRODUCTION

On February 22, 2010, Americans United for Separation of Church and
State wrote a letter to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), alleging that Liberty
University had endorsed Scott Garrett in his run for the Virginia House of
Delegates and had attacked his opponent, Shannon Valentine. 2 The problem?
As an educational institution, Liberty University is a public charity and, as
such, is exempt from the federal income tax under § 501(c)(3). As one of the
conditions of the tax exemption for public charities, § 501(c)(3) prohibits taxexempt public charities from engaging in any campaigning for or against any
candidate for office.3 The penalty for a public charity that engages in any
campaigning is the loss of its tax exemption.'
How did Liberty University allegedly violate the prohibition on
campaigning? According to Americans United, the school used its student
newspaper, the Liberty Champion, to support Garrett and to oppose the
incumbent Valentine.' The paper, Americans United alleged, was not
independent, but was under the control of the university, and was therefore
speaking for the university.6 Because Liberty University had violated the

I. WOODY GUTHRIE, Don'tYouPush MeDown, onNURSERYDAYS (Smithsonian Folkways 1992),
available at http://media.smithsonianfolkways.org/liner notes/ smithsonianfolkways/SFW45036.pdf.
Letter from Barry W. Lynn, Exec. Dir., Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, to Lois
2.
G. Lerner, Dir. Exempt Orgs. Div., Internal Revenue Serv. (Feb. 22, 2010), availableat http://www.au.org/
medialpress-releases/archives/2010/02/letter-to-irs-re-liberty-u.pdf.
3.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
4.
"The house OBRA Report explicitly affirmed that the bar on campaign intervention by churches
is absolute and that any amount of such conduct renders an organization wholly ineligible for exemption
from federal income taxes and receipt of tax-deductible contributions." Anne Berrill Carroll, Religion,
Politics, and the IRS: Defining the Limits of Tax Law Controls on PoliticalExpression by Churches, 76
MARQ. L. REv. 217, 229 (1992).
Quick Takes: DidLiberty U. Violate Tax Status With Partisanship?,INSIDE HIGHERED (Feb. 25,
5.
2010), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2010/02/25/qt#221146.
Letter from Barry W. Lynn, supra note 2, at 2. In 1972, the IRS ruled that universities will not
6.
be treated as endorsing or opposing a candidate for office as the result of editorial statements in student
newspapers, even if the university makes professors available as advisors, provided the editorials are voted
on by the newspaper's editorial board and provided that neither the administration of the university nor the
advisors to the newspaper exercise "control or direction" over the newspaper's editorial policies. Rev. Rul.
72-513, 1972-2 C.B. 246. Thus, in order for Liberty University to lose its exemption as a result of a student
newspaper's editorial content, the IRS would have to find that the university administration, not the students

HeinOnline -- 8 Pitt. Tax Rev. 127 2010-2011

128

PITTSBURGH TAX REVIEW

[Vol. 8:125

prohibition on campaigning through the student newspaper, Americans United
requested that the IRS investigate the matter and, presumably, revoke Liberty
University's tax-exempt status.
Even if the IRS determines that Liberty University violated the
campaigning prohibition, it is unlikely to revoke the school's tax exemption.'
The IRS's reluctance to revoke public charities' tax exemption may in part
result from the fact that their enforcement toolbox is weighted heavily toward
"hard shoves" and that it lacks an explicit mandate to gently nudge public
charities away from campaigning.'
The current enforcement regime has proven to be ineffective at preventing
public charities from endorsing candidates for office, at least in part because
the prohibition is not enforced. This Article will propose that the current
enforcement regime be altered and that the IRS be granted explicit authority
to impose an intermediate penalty on public charities that participate in
campaigning. Although the IRS will still have the option of revoking a public
charity's tax exemption if it violates the prohibition, having an intermediate
penalty at its fingertips would make enforcing the prohibition more palatable
to the IRS, especially where the IRS determines that the violation does not
warrant a punishment as drastic as loss of an entity's tax exemption.
The intermediate penalty proposed by the Article would disallow a portion
of donors' charitable deduction, with the percentage of the disallowance
determined roughly by the seriousness of the public charity's violation. By
providing such an intermediate penalty in the IRS's arsenal, the IRS faces
fewer disincentives in enforcing the prohibition. And as the IRS imposes

on the editorial board, controlled the paper. See id
7.
Letter from Barry W. Lynn, supranote 2, at 3. Americans United could not sue for revocation
ofLiberty University's tax-exempt status because § 501(c)(3) does not create a private right ofaction against
public charities that violate the prohibition on campaigning, and therefore taxpayers have no standing to sue
for alleged violations of § 501(c)(3) by public charities. Amato v. UPMC, 371 F. Supp. 2d 752, 756 (W.D.
Pa. 2005) ("First of all, the plaintiffs have no private right of action under § 501(c)(3), as the statute does
not authorize private third party claims.").
8.
In spite of anecdotal evidence that some public charities are flouting the ban, the IRS only rarely
revokes public charities' tax-exempt status. See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, GraspingSmoke: Enforcing the Ban
on PoliticalActivity by Charities,6 FIRST AMEND. L. REv. 1, 12-13 (2007).
See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. HardShoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U.
9.
CHI. L. REv. 607, 608 (2000). Professor Dan Kahan introduced the idea of "hard shoves" and "gentle
nudges." See id. Professor Kahan argues that the impulse to create stiffer punishments for undesirable
behaviors is counterproductive in changing people's behavior. When the punishment is too severe, those
charged with enforcing the law will balk. Where the punishment is less severe, the law is more likely to be
enforced, and the new norm is more likely to stick. Id at 608.
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penalties on public charities that campaign, public charities will become less
likely to participate in the prohibited behavior.
I. EXEMPTING PUBLIC CHARITIES FROM TAX
The federal income tax touches virtually every aspect of American life.'
Congress has chosen, though, to exempt certain entities from the reach of the
tax law. The Internal Revenue Code provides that certain types of entities are
"exempt from taxation."" The most prominent of these tax-exempt
organizations are what we call "public charities." However, although the tax
law exempts public charities from taxation, it also imposes certain restrictions
on the activities in which they can engage, and significant (though
underemployed) penalties if they violate the restrictions.
A. Public Charitiesand Their Advantageous Tax Treatment
Public charities are entities "organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational
purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition . . .,
or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals." 2 An organization that
qualifies as a public charity is generally is not required to pay any income
tax. " The traditional explanation for why public charities have been removed
from the tax rolls is that "they relieve the government from the burden of
performing certain services or providing certain goods to the public." 4 In
order to encourage private entities to provide these public goods, Congress
provided public charities with a tax exemption."

10. See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, On the Limits ofCharity:Lobbying, Litigation,andElectoralPolitics
by CharitableOrganizations Under the InternalRevenue Code and RelatedLaws, 69 BROOK. L. REV. I,
1 (2003) ("If there is a single document that defines these values in American life it is the Internal Revenue
Code, whose rewards and penalties rate nearly every activity in which Americans engage.").
11. I.R.C. § 501(a).
12. Id. § 501(c)(3).
13. See id § 501(a). Public charities were first removed from the tax rolls in 1894, and have been
exempt from the federal income tax ever since. See Houck, supra note 10, at I n. I ("[The Revenue Act of
1894's] provisions on charities became the prototype for the 1913 Revenue Act ... and has remained
verbatim in the Code from that date."). Public charities are not the only tax-exempt entities, however.
Various other entities, including labor unions, chambers of commerce, and certain clubs, fraternal orders,
and nonprofit credit unions are also exempt from federal taxation. I.R.C. § 501(c)(5), (6), (10), (14).
14. Robert Paine, The Tax TreatmentofInternationalPhilanthropyandPublic Policy, 19 AKRON
TAx J. 1, 12 (2004).
15. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1983).
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Their tax exemption is not the only tax advantage public charities enjoy;
in addition to being exempt from tax themselves, donations to public charities
can be deducted by donors.'" The deduction for donations to public charities
is only slightly newer than the exemption for public charities, having been
enacted in 1917. " Effectively, this deduction functions as a second subsidy to
public charities, allowing donors to make larger contributions to the public
charities than they otherwise could or would have made.
By virtue of its tax exemption, a public charity can keep every dollar it
earns.' 8 In addition, because donors can deduct charitable donations, they are
able to donate a larger after-tax amount than they would be able to donate if
there were no deduction available.' 9 Because the tax law exempts public
charities from tax and allows donors to deduct their donations, it effectively
multiplies the amount of money available to public charities in relation to the
amount that would be available to organizations that are not exempt from tax.
B. Conditions of the Tax Exemption: The CampaigningProhibition
The beneficial tax treatment available to public charities is not costless to
the charities, however. The tax law imposes certain restrictions on the way a
qualifying public charity can act. For example, no substantial part of a public
charity's activities can involve attempting to influence legislation. In addition,
the Code provides a blanket proscription on public charities' intervening in
political campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate.20 If a public
charity engages in a substantial amount of lobbying or supports or opposes a
candidate for office, it no longer qualifies for a tax exemption, and its tax
exemption should thus be revoked. 2'

16. I.R.C. § 170(a)(1).
17. See Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the FederalIncome Tax Exemption for Charitable
Organizations:A Theory ofRisk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REv. 419,423 n.6 (1998).
18. By way of comparison, taxable corporations with income in excess of$10 million are subject
to a marginal tax rate of 35%, and can keep only 65 cents of every dollar they spend. See I.R.C.
§ 11(b)(1)(d).
19. An individual in the highest tax bracket is currently subject to a marginal rate of 35%. Id.
§ I(i)(2). Assuming that she earns $100 and wants to donate that $100, the amount she can afford to donate
depends of the tax treatment of her donation. If she cannot deduct the donation, she must pay $35 in taxes,
and only has $65 left to donate. But if the donation is deductible, she can afford to donate the full $100.
20. See id. § 501(c)(3). In addition to the political restrictions, the net earnings of a public charity
cannot inure to the benefit of any shareholder or other individual. See id
21. An organization that does not meet both an organizational and an operational test prescribed by
the Treasury regulations is not exempt from tax. Treas. Reg. § l.501(c)(3)-l(a)(1) (as amended in 2008).
An organization fails the operational test if it "participates or intervenes ... in any political campaign on
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In practice, the IRS often does not revoke public charities' exemptions for
violating the prohibition.22 In fact, in many cases, it appears that the IRS does
not impose any penalty at all on public charities that violate the prohibition. 3
The consequences of losing the tax exemption appear to be different for
nonchurch public charities than they are for churches.24 If the IRS were to
revoke a nonchurch public charity's tax exemption, the result would likely be
catastrophic for that charity.
Immediately upon losing its exemption, the nonchurch public charity
would be required to pay taxes on its income, and donors would no longer be
able to deduct their donations. If such a public charity ceases to qualify under
§ 501(c)(3) because it supported or opposed a candidate for public office, the
Code prevents it from transforming itself into a social welfare organization,
exempt under § 501(c)(4).25 Moreover, under Treasury regulations, the entity
cannot in the future qualify for exemption under any provision of the Code
other than § 501(c)(3). 26 To regain its tax-exempt status, the disqualified
organization must reapply for a tax exemption.2 7 It cannot reapply, however,
until the year after the exemption was withdrawn. 28 As a result of its political

behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public office."Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(3)(iii). A public charity
that does participate in campaigning is "disqualified as exempt." Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154.
22. See infra notes 129-42 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 129-42 and accompanying text.
24. Commentators have largely gravitated toward the question ofwhether the prohibition on political
campaign intervention is null and void in relation to churches. Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., On Not
Rendering to Caesar:The Unconstitutionalityof Tax RegulationofActivities ofReligious Organizations
Relatingto Politics,40 DEPAUL L. REV. 1,3 (1990) ("I conclude that the restraints imposed ... [on political]
activities of religious organization violate the free exercise and free speech rights of these exempt
organizations."); Meghan J. Ryan, Can the IRS Silence Religious Organizations?,40 IND. L. REV. 73, 83
(2007) ("Limiting an organization's political activities presents distinct First Amendment concerns when
applied to religious organizations because the Free Exercise Clause imposes additional constitutional
protections when religious organizations are involved."); Allan J. Samansky, Tax Consequences When
Churches Participatein PoliticalCampaigns, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 145, 155 (2007) ("Religion is
different from other charitable causes, and valid reasons exist for special treatment of political activity by
churches."); Jennifer M. Smith, Morse Code, Da Vinci Code, Tax Code and... Churches: An Historical
and ConstitutionalAnalysis of Why Section 501(c)(3) Does Not Apply to Churches, 23 J.L. & POL. 41,
75-76 (2007) ("Moreover, the subsidy argument is unconvincing and violates the First Amendment when
applied to churches because unlike other charitable organizations, churches are dually protected under the
Religion Clauses."); see also Keith S. Blair, Prayingfor a Tax Break: Churches,PoliticalSpeech, andthe
Loss ofSection 501(c)(3) Tax Exempt Status, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 405, 420-21 (2009).

25. See I.R.C. § 504(a).
26. Treas. Reg. § 1.504-1 (1990) ("Further, an organization denied treatment as an organization
described in section 501 (c)(4) under this section may not be treated as an organization described in section
50 1(c) other than as an organization described in section 501(c)(3).").
27. Treas. Reg. § l.501(h)-3(d)(1) (1990).
28. Id.

HeinOnline -- 8 Pitt. Tax Rev. 131 2010-2011

132

PITTSBURGH TAX REVIEW

[Vol. 8:125

campaign intervention, then, the nonchurch public charity becomes fully
taxable for at least some period of time.
In contrast, the burden to churches of losing their exempt status appears
more symbolic than substantive: there is little economic burden to churches of
losing their tax-exempt status. Admittedly, a church that campaigns for or
against an individual will lose its exemption, just like any other public charity.
But the court in Branch Ministries v. Rossotti described a church's loss of
exempt status as being "more symbolic than substantial." 29 The IRS agreed
that loss of exempt status would not cause donations to become taxable income
to the church, and donors would continue to be able to deduct donations to the
extent the church did not intervene in future political campaigns.30 Unlike
other organizations seeking an exemption from tax under § 501 (c)(3), churches
are not required to apply for an exemption; their exemption comes
automatically. 3 The church itself would lose nothing, and donors would only
lose "the advance assurance of deductibility in the event [the] donor[s] should
be audited." 3 2 Because the harm of a church's losing its exemption is more
symbolic than substantive, the harm to the church of participating in a political
campaign is more illusory than the very real harms suffered by a nonchurch
public charity.
Moreover, a nonchurch public charity is likely to see its donor base shrink
more than a church would upon the loss of the deductibility of donations.
Taxpayers choose between taking their itemized deductions (which include the
charitable deduction3 3) and taking the standard deduction.34 In 2006, only
35.4% of taxpayers itemized their deductions." However, "[1]ower-income
taxpayers, those taxpayers least likely to itemize, are also the taxpayers who
favor religious organizations in making their charitable contributions. ,36

29. Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
30. Id. at 142-43.
31. Compare I.R.C. § 508(c) with id. § 508(a).
32. Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 142-43.
33. Itemized deductions are all deductions other than the deductions permissible in determining
adjusted gross income and those permitted by § 15 1.I.R.C. § 63(d). The charitable deduction is authorized
by § 170, and is not used to determine adjusted gross income. See id. § 62(a) for the definition of gross
income.
34. See id § 63(e)(1).
35. Brian Balkovic, IndividualIncome Tax Returns, PreliminaryData,2006, STAT. INCOME BULL.,
Spring 2008, at 4, 7, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soil06inreturnbul.pdf Although the 35.4%
represents a snapshot, the percentage of itemizers in 2006 does not appear to be a significant outlier. See
Ellen P. Aprill, Churches,Politics, and the CharitableContributionDeduction, 42 B.C. L. REV. 843, 845
(2001) ("Only 30% of taxpayers itemize their deductions.").
36. Aprill, supranote 35, at 846.
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Because nonitemizers do not get a deduction for their charitable contributions,
whether a church is tax-exempt or not is unlikely to significantly affect
whether or how much donors give. On the other hand, high-income taxpayers
are more likely to make gifts to "colleges and universities, hospitals, and arts
and cultural organizations."" Because high-income taxpayers are more likely
to itemize, the loss of tax-exempt status by nonchurch entities is more likely
to affect itemizers' determination of whether and how much to donate. When
their favored public charity loses its tax-exempt status, however, wealthy
donors will not be able to deduct amounts donated to the organization. In that
case, they should be more likely than nonitemizers to take the lost tax
deduction into account in determining whether and how much to give.
By virtue of their nature, public charities inhabit a unique place in the tax
law. They do not pay taxes, and donors to the public charities can deduct the
amount of their donations for tax purposes. In exchange for this advantageous
tax treatment, though, public charities are prohibited from campaigning. If the
IRS finds that a public charity has violated the campaigning prohibition, the
IRS is obligated to revoke its exemption, which, in many cases, would cripple
or destroy the public charity. But the IRS often fails to revoke the tax
exemption, which means, in many cases, public charities can get these unique
tax benefits without paying the price for the benefits.

37. Charles T. Clotfelter & Richard Schmalbeck, The Impact of Fundamental Tax Reform on
Nonprofit Organizations,in EcoNoMIC EFFECTS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 211, 215 (Henry J. Aaron
& William G. Gale eds., 1996); see Aprill, supra note 35, at 868-69.
The impact of the charitable contribution deduction should be of particular concern to religious
congregations, both because many espouse a moral belief in equality of all and because this system
favors the charitable activities favored by the wealthy. The wealthy favor cultural institutions and
institutions of higher learning instead of religious and social welfare organizations.
Id. The Center on Philanthropy estimates that in 2005, 42% of households with incomes of less than
$100,000 donated to religious causes, providing 59.4% of the funds raised by religious organizations. See
CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY, IND. UNIV., PATTERNS OF HOUSEHOLD CHARITABLE GIVING BY INCOME GROUP,
2005, at 1,5 (2007), http://www.philanthropy.iupui.edu/research/giving%20focused%20on%20meeting%
20needs%20of%20the%20poor/o2Ojuly%202007.pdf. Seventy-five percent of households with incomes
ofbetween $200,000 and $1 million donated to religious organizations, providing 20.8% of the funds raised
by religious organizations, and 70.9% of households with incomes of $1 million or more provided 8.6% of
the funds raised by religious organizations. Id. at 5. Only 11.2% of households earning less than $100,000
gave to education, accounting for 5.9% of the funds raised by educational charities, as opposed to 82.2%
of households earning between $200,000 and $1 million and 82.9% of households earning more than $1
million, which provided 63.5% and 28.2%, respectively, of the funds raised by education. Id. at 9. Likewise,
6.2% of households earning less than $100,000 donated to the arts, accounting for 4.4% of the funds raised
by the arts, as opposed to 71.8% of households earning between $200,000 and $1 million and 77.4% of
households earning more than $1 million, which provided 59.3% and 34.4%, respectively, of the funds
raised by the arts. Id. at 10.
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II. THE PROVENANCE OF THE CAMPAIGNING PROHIBITION

The history of the prohibition on campaigning does little to clarify why
Congress felt it necessary to prevent public charities from campaigning. And
the little glimmers of explanation that can be discerned from its history do
nothing to explain why a public charity should lose its tax exemption as a
result of its campaigning activities, no matter how negligible. As a result of the
sparseness of historical explanation, the IRS cannot look to the events of 1954
to explain why it should revoke a public charity's tax exemption if it endorses
or opposes a candidate for public office.
Almost from the beginning of the modern tax law, the degree to which a
charitable organization remained exempt from taxation while trying to
influence legislation and public policy was up for debate. As early as 1919, the
Treasury tried to draw a line between "educational" endeavors, which it
considered charitable, and "propaganda," which was not.39 Likewise, the
courts, while recognizing that charitable organizations could participate in
political activity, found that certain political activity disqualified an
organization from being charitable. 40
Finally, in 1934, the issue of public charities' political participation came
to a head in the wake of a fight between the incoming President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, who needed to cut back on the generous veterans' benefits passed
by Congress, and veterans' groups, which wanted to retain the benefits. 41 The
National Economy League, a probusiness lobbying organization, argued
strongly against the veterans' benefits.42 Senator David A. Reed of
Pennsylvania, a member of the Senate Committee on Finance, wanted to
remove the tax exemption of the National Economy League and other
charitable organizations that were lobbying to further the "personal interests"
of their donors.43 Ultimately, Congress amended the Code to provide that a
charitable organization would lose its tax exemption if it engaged in
"substantial' activities in 'carrying propaganda or otherwise attempting to

38. For purposes of this Article, a sketch of the history of political prohibitions will be sufficient.
For an extensive exploration of the history ofthe prohibition, see Patrick L. O'Daniel, MoreHonoredin the
Breach:A HistoricalPerspectiveofthe PermeableIRS Prohibitionon Campaigningby Churches,42 B.C.
L. REv. 733 (2001).
39. Houck, supra note 10, at 9-12.
40. Id. at 13-15.
41. See Vaughn E. James, The African-A merican Church,PoliticalActivity, and Tax Exemption, 37
SETON HALL L. REv. 371, 379-80 (2007).
42. See Houck, supra note 10, at 20.
43. Smith, supranote 24, at 68.
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influence legislation."' This prohibition against public charities' engaging in
substantial political activities remains in the Code today.4 5
In 1954, Congress placed an additional limit on public charities'
participation in electoral politics. On July 2, 1954, Senator Lyndon Johnson
proposed that § 501(c)(3) be amended to proscribe a public charity's acting on
behalf of or against any individual candidate for public office." The Senate did
not hold any hearings on the provision, nor was there any debate. 47 No
committee report exists explaining the proscription and no legislative history
beyond a brief statement in which Senator Johnson stated that the amendment
was intended to "'extend' the limitation of 501(c)(3)."48 There is, in fact, no
record of the voice vote on the Senator's proposed amendment. 49 Although
there is no legislative history of the provision, it appears that "Johnson saw a
cabal of national conservative forces, led by tax-exempt educational entities
fueled by corporate donations, arrayed against him and wanted to put a stop
to the meddling of these foreign interlopers . . ." Although it is difficult to
identify any specific tax policy underlying the prohibition of certain political
actions by public charities, once the prohibition had found its way into the
Code, "Congress had spoken, [and] the question of whether such prohibitions
were wise was foreclosed. . .""

The legislative history of the campaign prohibition thus appears to be a
general unease with public charities being too involved in politics combined
with particular animosity between powerful politicians and outspoken
organizations that claimed tax exemptions as public charities.5 2 The history

44.

Houck, supra note 10, at 22.

45. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
46. See O'Daniel, supra note 38, at 740.
47. Samansky, supra note 24, at 156-57.
48. James, supra note 41, at 381.
49. Gaffney, supranote 24, at 24 ("Within a few seconds or-if one is a slow reader-a few minutes,
one can master all there is to know about the legislative history of this second significant conditional
restraint on the political freedom of exempt organizations.").
50. O'Daniel, supra note 38, at 768; see also James,supra note 41, at 382 ("In the absence of any
legislative history explaining Senator Johnson's reasons for proposing the amendment, commentators have
opined that Senator Johnson was motivated by his fear that nonprofit organizations were working on behalf
of a campaign opponent to unseat him.").
51. Houck, supra note 10, at 29.
52. See Laura Brown Chisolm, PoliticsandCharity:A ProposalforPeaceful Coexistence, 58 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 308,337 n.130 (1990) ("The best direct evidence, however, strongly suggests that the major
motivation for the section 501(c)(3) treatment of campaign intervention has been overreaction to isolated
incidents and periodic personal affront to individual legislators rather than response to either careful
empirical data or sound theoretical underpinnings."); see also Elias Clark, The Limitation on Political
Activities: A DiscordantNote in theLaw ofCharities,46 VA. L. REv. 439, 446 (1960) ("It is not clear from
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does not explain, however, why such discomfort and animosity should lead to
a blanket prohibition or why the consequences of that prohibition should be
the loss of a public charity's exemption from tax.
III. THE NORMATIVE DEBATE: CONTEMPORARY EXPLANATIONS FOR THE
CAMPAIGNING PROHIBITION

In the absence of a clear historical justification, the prohibition on
campaigning by public charities has been subject to "considerable attention
from both critics and supporters."s" Supporters argue that the ban is necessary,
both to protect democracy and to protect public charities themselves, and that
it must be vigorously enforced.54 Critics, on the other hand, argue that the ban
is both unnecessary and an unconscionable burden on public charities' rights
and should be repealed. 5
Ultimately, the supporters and the opponents of the prohibition are at an
impasse. Both the supporters and the opponents of the ban make arguments
that they believe are compelling in justifying their support or opposition. But,
as this Section will show, the opponents of the ban respond that the supporters'
arguments are flawed, and the supporters of the ban react similarly to the
arguments put forward by the opponents. Even after the debate, there is not a
clear justification for maintaining or repealing the prohibition. Moreover, the
long-standing controversy neither provides a normative justification for
revoking a public charity's tax exemption for violating the prohibition, nor
provides a clear mandate to the IRS for imposing the prescribed penalty.
A. Arguments in Favor of the Prohibition
Since the passage of the campaigning prohibition, supporters of the
prohibition have justified its necessity using four broad categories of
arguments. First, government should not pay for or subsidize political
activity." Second, allowing private charities to participate in political activity

the early history of the restriction on political activities whether it evolved as a result of carefully considered
policy, or of the Treasury's understandable desire to place outer limits around any exemption, or on the
assumption that established property law required it.").
53. Benjamin M. Leff, "Sit Down and Count the Cost": A Frameworkfor Constitutionally Enforcing
the 501(c)(3)Campaign Intervention Ban, 28 VA. TAX REv. 673, 675 (2009).
54. See infra Part Ill.A.
55. See infra Part III.B.
56. See, e.g., Johnny Rex Buckles, Not Even a Peep? The RegulationofPoliticalCampaignActivity
by CharitiesThrough FederalTax Law, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1071, 1080 (2007) ("The crux of the argument
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is inconsistent with pursuing the broad public interest that public charities are
designed to promote." Third, partisan politics is, by definition, not
charitable." Fourth, if the prohibition were lifted, political donors would take
advantage of the double subsidy and funnel all of their political donations
through public charities." However, with critics responding to each of the
arguments, none stands out as an unimpeachable justification for the
prohibition.
1. Subsidizing PoliticalSpeech
Courts and commentators have argued that it was necessary to statutorily
limit public charities' ability to engage in political controversies because it is
inappropriate for the government to subsidize political speech. In fact, Judge
Learned Hand, in Slee v. Commissioner,60 stated that "[p]olitical agitation" by
public charities "must be conducted without public subvention; the Treasury

[against participation by public charities in electoral politics] is that the government must not subsidize
political activities."); Chisolm, supra note 52, at 337 ("First is the principle of nonsubvention: government
should not pay for political activity, even through the indirect mechanism of tax benefits."); Donald B.
Tobin, Political Campaigning by Churches and Charities:Hazardous for 501 (c)(3)s, Dangerousfor
Democracy, 95 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1336 (2007) ("[T]here is nothing in the common law to suggest that a
charitable organization should receive a financial subsidy from the government andbe allowed to invest that
subsidy in attempting to elect the charity's preferred candidate.").
57. See, e.g., Buckles, supra note 56, at 1085 ("Another argument in favor of prohibiting political
campaign intervention by charities is that such prohibition is necessary to prevent charities from furthering
a private interest."); Chisolm, supra note 52, at 337 ("Second is the apprehension that allowing political
involvement invites misuse of the section 501(c)(3) form in pursuit of private interests, rather than for the
broad public benefit that the charitable classification is designed to promote."); Tobin, supra note 56, at
1336 ("[I]ntervention in political campaigns by a 501(c)(3) organization impacts their core mission and
therefore undercuts the logic of providing special status to them in the first place.").
58. See, e.g., Buckles, supra note 56, at 1090 ("Another argument in support of forbidding
electioneering by charitable entities is that political activities are simply not 'charitable' activities under
common legal conceptions of charity."); Chisolm, supranote 52, at 337 ("Finally, the argument is made that
political involvement is, by definition, inconsistent with 'charity'-partisan political activity simply is not
charitable as we have long understood the term or as we understand it now, and charitable organizations
have no business straying into the partisan political arena."); Tobin, supranote 56, at 1338 ("1 argue that
political intervention is not consistent with our current and common definition of charitable."). Professor
Brian Galle offers an additional justification for the prohibition: that the prohibition may be intended to
prevent managers of public charities from being distracted by noncharitable activities. Brian Galle, The LDS
Church,Proposition 8, and the FederalLaw of Charities,103 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 370, 378 n.38
(2009), http://www.law.northwestern.edullawreview/colloquy/2009/10/LRColl2009n I OGalle.pdf.
59. See Tobin, supra note 56, at 1339 ("If the prohibition were lifted and such a subsidy were
granted, 501(c)(3) charities would then enjoy a preferred position over all other campaign organizations,
including a candidate's campaign organization.").
60. 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930).
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Department stands aside from them."' Underlying this sense that the Treasury
(and, by implication, the government) should stand aside from political
agitation is the idea that indirectly subsidizing political speech through a tax
exemption forces taxpayers to support candidates they do not want to
support.62 Moreover, the government "has not taken on the responsibility of
funding candidate campaigns and certainly has not decided to provide a
subsidy to [public charities] to do so."'6
In response, commentators point out that basing the prohibition on the
grounds that taxpayers are being forced to support distasteful candidates is
unconvincing at best. Taxpayers are routinely required to pay for government
expenditures that they may find objectionable.' Moreover, the connection
between donations that would not have been made but for their deductibility
and a public charity's support of a candidate is too attenuated to justify the
outright ban on campaigning.
Furthermore, objecting to the taxpayer subsidy of a public charity's
political speech presupposes that its tax exemption represents a governmental
subsidy. Some characterize the exemption differently. Professor Buckles
argues that public charities exist to benefit the community and, as such, act as
"qualified co-sovereigns." 66 Under this conception ofthe tax exemption, public
charities have been exempted from tax because it would be improper for the
government to tax a co-sovereign.6' Donations should be deductible because
the donors are "constituent parts" of the community and, in essence, are
donating to the community; the deductibility of donations merely recognizes
that the income belonged to the community, not the donor.68 Under this cosovereign theory, the government is not subsidizing charitable speech because
the government was not entitled to tax the income in the first instance. 69 It
follows that if there is no subsidy, no tax dollars went to support a candidate.

61. Id at 185.
62. Chisolm, supra note 52, at 338-39.
63. Tobin, supra note 56, at 1336.
64. See, e.g., Autenrieth v. Cullen, 418 F.2d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1969) ("The fact that some persons
may object, on religious grounds, to some of the things that the government does is not a basis upon which
they can claim a constitutional right not to pay a part of the tax.").
65. Chisolm, supranote 52, at 340. Moreover, as I argue below at Part III(A)(4), it is not clear that
allowing public charities to support candidates will result in any significant amount ofdonations intended
to be funneled to candidates.
66. Buckles, supra note 56, at 1083.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1084.
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Even accepting the co-sovereign theory of public charity, though, the
government may have an interest in limiting public charities' participation in
politics. Professor Leff argues that the government has an interest in "treating
all taxpayers alike when they seek to use their funds to influence the outcome
of an election."" Although the co-sovereign theory posits that there is no
subsidy to public charities because they are not a type of entity that can be
taxed, nonetheless, allowing them to campaign would treat certain donors
differently than others, in a way the government may want to avoid.
2. PrivateInterest
The prohibition is also justified on the basis that public charities are to act
in the public's interest, rather than in private interest. As such, a public
charity's actions are supposed to lead to public, rather than private, benefit.7
Presumably, absent the ban on campaigning, a public charity could act in the
private interest either of candidates, who would seek the public charity's
support, or of supporters of the candidate, who would seek the candidate's
election through the public charity."
In general, however, the benefits received by candidates and their
supporters do not appear to be the kind of private benefits proscribed by the
tax law. The Treasury regulations prohibit public charities from being
organized or operated "for the benefit of private interests such as designated
individuals, the creator or his family, shareholders of the organizations, or
persons controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private interests." While
the candidates and their supporters would, in theory, benefit from public
charities' support, there are often private beneficiaries of public charities'
actions. The poor and homeless benefit from nonprofit soup kitchens and
homeless shelters. Students and professors benefit from tax-exempt
universities. College athletes and sports fans benefit from the NCAA.
Parishioners benefit from the spiritual and temporal activities performed by
their churches. But the ancillary benefits enjoyed by certain private individuals
do not transform their public functions into private benefit.
Concededly, if a significant portion of a public charity's activities were
dedicated to electing a candidate for office, the public charity would appear to

70. Leff, supra note 53, at 676.
71. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2008) ("An organization is not organized
or operated exclusively for ... [an exempt purpose] unless it serves a public rather than a private interest.").
72. Buckles, supra note 56, at 1086.
73. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2008).
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be acting in that candidate's private interest rather than the public interest. But
endorsing candidates does not necessarily represent a solely private interest.
For example, because democracy has become so complex, it is difficult for
individual citizens to master all of the issues relevant and important in making
political decisions.74 To have a good democracy, then, it is necessary for
citizens to find experts and trustworthy surrogates." Although public charities
may have their own biases, they can also be one more voice to which citizens
could turn in evaluating candidates.
3. PoliticsAre Not Charitable
Additionally, some commentators argue that political activity is inimical
to the meaning of "charitable."" The argument can be framed by asserting that
under the common law, charitable organizations could perform certain
functions (e.g., care for the poor, provide comfort, help the community), and
that participating in political campaigns does not fit within one of those
charitable categories.7 The argument may also be framed with a more nuanced
view of the purposes of public charities (e.g., to provide services that the
government would otherwise be required to provide).78 Absent support from
public charities, this argument goes, government would be under no obligation
to support a candidate. Ultimately, this argument arrives in the same place:
because intervening in political campaigns is not a charitable activity,
organizations that campaign should not be permitted a tax exemption.
There is a second, paternalistic thread to using the argument that
campaigning is not charitable as a justification for prohibiting public charities
from campaigning. Under this thread, the problem with public charities'
participation in campaigning is not just that such campaigning is not a
charitable endeavor. Public charities that participate in campaigning are
affirmatively hurting themselves. For example, the argument goes, a church

74. Robert A. Dahl, The Problem of Civic Competence, J. DEMOCRACY, Oct. 1992, at 45, 50.
75. Id. at 53-54.
76. See, e.g., Tobin, supra note 56, at 1338.
77. Id. ("Using a charity's resources to promote a particular candidate, however, does not fit within
this definition [of the meaning of charitable] and calls the charitable mission of the charity into jeopardy.").
78. Ann M. Murphy, CampaignSignsand the Collection Plate-Neverthe Twain Shall Meet?, I PITE.
TAX REv. 35, 80 (2003) ("The grant of tax exemption is tied to the public service offered to the entity,
service that the government need no longer provide.").
79. Id. ("Charitable work involves areas such as feeding and clothing the poor, providing low-cost
medical care, and providing shelter. Attempting to elect a certain official is by no means a charitable
activity.").
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that supports a candidate risks alienating parishioners whose political leanings
differ from the endorsement.so Moreover, endorsing a candidate may turn away
potential donors, making it more difficult for public charities to raise the funds
they need to fulfill their charitable mission."
In response, some scholars argue that, although campaigning may not be
a charitable end, there is no reason why it cannot be a legitimate means to
accomplish the public charity's charitable purpose. Professor Buckles posits
a public charity organized with the clearly charitable purpose of relieving
poverty.
The charity furthers this purpose primarily by offering food and shelter to the homeless.
In an election year, the charity endorses a presidential candidate who promises to support
proposed legislation granting additional federal funds for homeless shelters and for the
vocational training of the unemployed homeless. In this hypothetical, the charity has
2
intervened in a political campaign in an attempt to further its charitable mission.

Although, strictly speaking, the charity's support of the presidential candidate
is not a charitable activity, neither is its purchase of food for the homeless. But
purchasing the food is a step toward providing food to the homeless; similarly,
endorsing a candidate who will help the homeless can be viewed as a step
toward the charity's performing its charitable purpose. Looking merely at the
endorsement, rather than the purpose underlying the endorsement, reflects an
unnecessarily restrictive view of both the transaction and of the public
charity's charitable activity." Just because a public charity engages in certain
activities that are not themselves charitable in nature, it does not mean that
those activities should cause the public charity to cease being considered a
charitable entity.84 This is particularly true when, as illustrated in the forgoing

80. Id at 81 ("The intervention in politics could turn believers away from the church or house of
worship.").
81. Tobin, supranote 56, at 1338 ("[C]harities that support political candidates may find it harder
to obtain funds and donations from outside sources.").
82. Buckles, supranote 56, at 1090-91.
83. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 4, at 252 ("Indeed, Section 501(c)(3)'s campaign prohibition,
together with its limitation on lobbying, constitutes an aberration even in the federal tax law, which
otherwise recognizes that the key to whether a group is 'exclusively' charitable under the Internal Revenue
Code lies in its purposes, not the means by which it accomplishes those purposes."); Chisolm, supra note
52, at 360 ("But the common law roots of the charitable tax exemption appear to reflect a distinction
between means and purposes.").
84. See Buckles, supranote 56, at 1090 ("The common law does not plainly render an institution
'non-charitable' simply because it seeks to further its admittedly charitable purposes in part through political
means.").
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example, the activity that is not inherently charitable is closely connected to,
and in furtherance of, the public charity's core charitable purpose.
Moreover, there is no reason that the tax law needs to protect public
charities from themselves. It is conceivable that a public charity's endorsement
of a candidate would turn certain supporters and donors away from that charity
because they disagreed with the endorsement. But nonpolitical decisions that
a public charity makes could also turn donors away. A donor may not like the
location or mix of services the public charity provides. She may object to the
administrative overhead. She may have personal issues with the board
members. But the tax law does not attempt to protect public charities from
doing anything that would alienate donors. Instead, public charities can
generally act as they will, within the legal scope of their charitable mandate.
Presumably, they take into account the effect of their actions on potential
donors. There is no reason to assume that, if they were allowed to campaign
for or against candidates, they would not continue to evaluate the value of
campaigning against the cost in terms of donor support.
4. Funneling
The fourth justification for the campaigning prohibition I call the
"funneling" concern. According to supporters of the campaigning prohibition,
if public charities were permitted to support or oppose candidates, rational
political donors would stop donating directly to candidates and, instead, would
make their political donations to public charities, with the understanding that
some or all of the donation would then be used by the public charity to support
or oppose the donor's candidate of choice." Political donors would prefer to
donate to a public charity that could then act for or against candidates, the
argument goes, because of the multiplier effect of public charities."

85. See, e.g., Tobin, supra note 56, at 1340 ("The supporter has a choice of donating $500,000 to
a political organization that supports Candidate A or B, or $500,000 to Church A or B [that will support
Candidate A or B], whereupon, depending on Supporter's tax situation, Supporter will receive a $500,000
tax deduction. Contributors in that situation will most surely contribute to the Church instead ofthe political
organization."); Richard J. Wood, Pious Politics: PoliticalSpeech Funded Through I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)
Organizations Examined Under Tax Fairness Principles, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 209, 217 (2007) ("Both Greta
and Oliver are purchasing political speech. Both have identical levels of income. Yet under the Act, Greta
would enjoy a tax advantage of the multiplier effect based on nothing other than a disparity in tax treatment
of the organization through which she speaks.").
86. Wood, supra note 85, at 246 ("Section 501(c)(3) organizations have the capacity to multiply the
dollars contributed to them far beyond the ability of traditional political organizations. That ... has proved
to be irresistible to some politicians and could lead to the diversion of funds away from political
organizations toward 501(c)(3) religious organizations.").
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Political donors would arguably donate to a public charity in place of
political organizations because, in addition to the public charity's not having
to pay taxes on the donations, the donors would be able to deduct the amount
they donated. "As a result, on an after-tax basis, those who donate to charities
are no worse off financially than they would have been had they donated
smaller, nondeductible sums" directly to a candidate." This multiplier effect
could make it more attractive to support or oppose candidates through public
charities rather than directly because the donor could donate more after-tax
dollars through a public charity than she could donate directly to a political
18
campaign.
In addition to concerns about tax fairness and policy, some commentators
have raised concerns about public charities themselves. Absent the prohibition,
these commentators argue, rational donors have a strong incentive to shift their
political donations from political organizations to public charities.89 In doing
so, donors would pressure the public charities to adopt the donors' political
views. In addition, donors could pressure public charities to change their
priorities, focusing less on their charitable missions and more on the donors'
political agendas. The prohibition, these commentators argue, protects public
charities' agendas from being subsumed by their donors' political agendas."o
The campaigning prohibition is not the only impediment to public
charities' becoming funnels for campaign contributions, however. Even if the
prohibition on campaigning by public charities were completely removed from

87. Buckles, supranote 56, at 1079. For example, a potential donor in the 35% tax bracket who earns
$1,000 that she wants to donate to a candidate can only afford to donate $650 to a political organization after
taxes. Because she can deduct contributions to public charities, though, in effect, there would be no tax cost
if she made the $1,000 donation to the public charity instead. Therefore, she can donate the full $1,000 aftertax amount that she intended to donate.
88. Professor Donald Tobin explains the potential problems like this:
A hypothetical supporter ofcandidate A or B is now faced with the question of how to contribute her
money in support of her chosen candidate. The supporter has a choice of donating $500,000 to a
political organization that supports Candidate A or B, or $500,000 to Church A or B, whereupon,
depending on Supporter's tax situation, Supporter will receive a $500,000 tax deduction.
Contributors in that situation will most surely contribute to the Church instead of the political
organization. A person in the 35% tax bracket will save $185,000 in taxes by donating to the Church
instead of to the candidate or political organization.
Tobin, supranote 56, at 1340-41. Provided that the IRS and courts enforce the "no substantial part" test
robustly, however, I find this concern that public charities will become conduits for political donations
unconvincing. See infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
89. Tobin, supranote 56, at 1341 ("A donor who itemizes deductions on her tax return will likely
make her political contributions to the Church instead of to the candidate's campaign or other independent
organization.").
90. Id. at 1322-26, 1337 (discussing capture of 501(c)(3)'s).
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§ 501 (c)(3), the "no substantial part" requirement would significantly limit the
amount of support public charities could provide to candidates for office.
As has been previously discussed, to maintain their tax-exempt status, "no
substantial part" of a public charity's activities can include "carrying on
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation."" A public
charity that allocates between "16 and 20 percent" of its annual expenditures
to influencing legislation has been held in violation of the "no substantial part"
rule.92 On the other hand, where less than 5% of a public charity's activities
were devoted to influencing politics, the Sixth Circuit held that its political
activities were insubstantial. It would appear that the "line between what is
substantial and what is insubstantial lies between five and 15% of an
organization's total activities, as measured by time, effort, expenditure and
other relevant factors."94
To the extent that the "no substantial part" rule is enforced robustly, it
should reduce concerns about the multiplier effect of supporting political
candidates through public charities. Because political advocacy is not a
qualifying charitable purpose, as made clear by the "no substantial part" rule,
even without the campaigning ban a public charity could not act as a conduit,
using every dollar it receives to campaign on behalf of a political candidate.
Because of the constraints on its funneling money, donating to a political
campaign through a public charity will generally be less beneficial than it
would appear on first glance: in general, a public charity could use less than
15% of a donor's (deductible) contribution to campaign for a candidate, while
a political organization could use 100% of a donor's (nondeductible)
contribution."
91. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
92. See Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1146 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
93. Seasongood v. Comm'r, 227 F.2d 907, 912 (6th Cir. 1955). Money is not the sole criterion by
which a public charity can use a substantial part of its activities in propaganda or influencing legislation.
The percentage of time and effort an organization's employees and directors engage in political activities
may also indicate substantiality. See Kuper v. Comm'r, 332 F.2d 562, 562 (3d Cir. 1964); I.R.S. Gen.
Couns. Mem. 38,437 (July 8, 1980). The IRS has held, moreover, that "[a]n organization which, as its
primary objective, advocates the adoption of a doctrine or theory which can become effective only by the
enactment of legislation" can never qualify as a tax-exempt public charity. Rev. Rul. 62-71, 1962-1 C.B.
85.
94. Deirdre Dessingue Halloran & Kevin M. Kearney, FederalTax Code Restrictions on Church
PoliticalActivity, 38 CATH. LAW. 105, 108 n.18 (1998).
95. This is not to suggest that public charities cannot act as efficient conduits and multipliers of
charitable donations. It is possible that CharityCo intends to spend money on its charitable purpose and has
no current intention of spending any money to try to influence legislation or support or oppose any
individual candidate. In that case, assuming CharityCo is comfortable that 10% of its expenditures is
permitted under the "no substantial part" test, it has unused political capacity. That is, it can spend an
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B. Arguments in Favor ofPermittingIncreasedPoliticalActivity
Critics of the prohibition have argued that the campaigning prohibition
should be eliminated or significantly curtailed. These commentators raise a
number of arguments that can largely be described in three main categories.
First, they argue that there are constitutional problems with the current
prohibition. Second, public charities' historic role has included "shaping major
social movements with enormous political implications." Third, to protect
themselves and their charitable interests from the vagaries of the political
world, public charities need to have some input into their "governmental
'partners."' Ultimately, though, supporters of the prohibition have been able
to respond to each of these arguments, and none has been sufficiently
persuasive to get the law changed.
1. The ProhibitionViolates the Constitution and FederalStatute
Some commentators argue that the prohibition against campaigning by
public charities is unconstitutional. Such arguments include that the
prohibition is unconstitutionally vague"6 and that it is unconstitutionally
overbroad.97 More specifically, commentators note that the prohibition has
been challenged as infringing on the right to free speech and petition under the
First Amendment and violating Fifth Amendment guarantee of equal
protection of the laws.,9
In general, though, courts have upheld Congress's ability to condition taxexempt status on public charities' political speech. In Regan v. Taxation With
Representation of Washington," the Supreme Court held that there was no

amount equal to about I1% of the amount of charitable purpose expenditures it intends to make on political
expenditures and still feel comfortable that it qualifies for its tax exemption under § 501(c)(3). Moreover,
10% of a large public charity's expenditures, while relatively small compared with the size of the
organization, could still constitute a significant amount of money. See, e.g., Galle,supra note 58, at 375-76
("The implication is that a sufficiently large entity could spend billions of dollars without violating the
prohibition against 'substantial' lobbying efforts.").
96. Carroll, supra note 4, at 256 ("Without clarification of the restriction, churches and other
charitable organizations would continue to lack adequate notice to comply with even a more narrowly
applicable limitation on their electoral activities.").
97. Chisolm, supra note 52, at 362 ("Because the broad proscription is entirely unnecessary to
accomplish the goals of the charitable exemption and deductibility, it is constitutionally suspect.").
98. Wilfred R. Caron & Deirdre Dessingue, I.R.C. § 501(c)(3): Practicaland Constitutional
Implications of "Political"Activity Restrictions, 2 J.L. & POL. 169, 180-81 (1985).
99. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
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constitutional problem with the IRS's denial of tax-exempt status to an
organization that intended to do a substantial amount of lobbying.' 00 Taxation
With Representation argued that the lobbying limitation violated the First
Amendment because it imposed an "unconstitutional condition" on the receipt
of deductible contributions."o' The Supreme Court responded that, while the
government cannot deny a benefit to a person because she exercises her
constitutional rights, neither is the government required to provide an
exemption to taxpayers; in this case, the government merely refused to
subsidize Taxation With Representation's political activities.102
Professor Chisolm argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Taxation
With Representationdid not answer the constitutional question presented by
the prohibition on campaigning, because public charities have other options for
lobbying that they do not have for campaigning. 03 Rather, the campaigning
prohibition was subject to a less-clear unconstitutional conditions analysis."
Since Professor Chisolm's article, however, the District of Columbia Circuit
ruled in Branch Ministriesv. Rossotti that the prohibition on campaigning did
not constitute and unconstitutional burden by forcing Branch Ministries to
choose between its exemption and protected speech.'
Some commentators argue that, even if the prohibition on campaigning
is not unconstitutional as applied in general to public charities, that it is
unconstitutional as applied to churches. The Free Exercise Clause of the
Constitution provides churches with even more protection than the First
Amendment provides to nonchurch public charities. 06

100. Id. at 545.
101. Id
102. Id However, although the Supreme Court uses the language of subsidy to describe the tax
exemption, that may not be an entirely accurate characterization of tax exemption. See supra notes 66-69
and accompanying text.
103. Chisolm, supranote 52, at 332 ("Thus, Taxation With Representation [sic] does not settle the
question of whether the section 501(c)(3) prohibition on campaign participation is an unconstitutional
condition. The difficult question that the Court, rightly or wrongly, was able to avoid in Taxation With
Representation [sic] cannot be dodged in the case of the campaign intervention prohibition.").
104. See id. at 333.
105. Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
106. Ryan, supra note 24, at 83 ("This blending of political and religious speech and actions
exacerbates the free speech and free exercise concerns implicated when applying § 501(c)(3) and the IRS's
corresponding regulations to religious organizations."). If churches were to be treated differently than
nonchurch public charities for § 501(c)(3) purposes, it could raise the specter of the Establishment Clause.
Arguably, treating a church differently (and better) than a nonchurch public charity could be seen as an
establishment of religion. See Galle,supranote 58, at 376 n.32 ("It is, however, also possible that a scheme
permitting only churches to lobby with little limit would violate the Establishment Clause."). Others
disagree, arguing that historically, the tax law has treated churches differently in some contexts without
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Even if the prohibition on political campaigning by churches does not
violate their free speech or exercise rights, though, some commentators argue
that, as applied to religious institutions, it violates the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). o7 Congress enacted RFRA in response to the
Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith,'" in which the
Court "abandoned the compelling-interest test as applied to free-exercise
claims, holding that it did not apply to generally applicable, facially neutral
laws."o' RFRA reinstated the more-stringent compelling-interest standard in
evaluating free-exercise claims."o Under RFRA, the federal government would
be required to make a "case-by-case determination of the extent to which
politically-oriented speech is part of religious practice or activity.""' It is
likely that at least some church political speech would be protected under

RFRA112
The Branch Ministries court found, however, that the prohibition on
campaigning did not unconstitutionally burden the petitioner church's right to
free exercise of religion."' It also held that the law as applied to Branch
Ministries did not violate RFRA." 4 Still, it is possible that, in some
circumstances, the prohibition could violate the First Amendment or RFRA."'
And even if the prohibition does not technically violate the Constitution, it
may still be "contrary to free speech values" and other values that underlie the
Constitution."'

violating the Establishment Clause. Smith, supra note 24, at 82 ("However, if churches are treated
differently than other tax-exempt organizations, will the Establishment Clause be violated? The answer is
probably not. Historically, churches have been treated differently, perhaps because of their significant
contributions to America and the world. Since this country's founding, churches have been accorded a
special place in society.").
107. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006).
108. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
109. Michelle O'Connor, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Exactly What Rights Does It
"Restore" in the Federal Tax Context?, 36 ARIz. ST. L.J. 321, 353 (2004).
110. Chris Kemmitt, RFRA, Churches, and the IRS: Reconsidering the Legal Boundaries ofChurch
Activity in the PoliticalSphere, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 145, 163 (2006).
111. Samansky, supra note 24, at 177.
112. See id.
113. Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
114. Id.
115. See generallyLloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Politicsat the Pulpit: Tax Benefits, SubstantialBurdens,and
InstitutionalFreeExercise, 89 B.C. L. REv. 1137 (2009) (arguing that a First Amendment challenge to the
prohibition as applied to churches would probably fail, but that RFRA would likely require a narrow
exception to the prohibition).
116. Chisolm, supranote 52, at 315.

HeinOnline -- 8 Pitt. Tax Rev. 147 2010-2011

148

PITTSBURGH TAX REVIEW

[Vol. 8:125

2. Public CharitiesHave HistoricallyParticipatedin PoliticalDiscourse
Commentators who oppose the campaigning restriction also point to the
historic role ofpublic charities in forming public policy. Historically, religious
and other charitable institutions have been at the forefront of fighting for
abolition, suffrage, and civil rights.'" Refusing to allow public charities to
participate in the political sphere "ignore[s] their significant historical
contributions to our country, contributions that illustrate their vital place in
democratic government.""
And public charities' contributions to democracy are not all in the past.
Because they are organized to serve the public interest rather than a narrow
self-interest, public charities may be able to provide legislators, and the voting
public in general, with information that could act as a counterweight to the
information provided by private lobbyists and interest groups." 9 Among other
things, public charities are "particularly situated to notice and say that the
emperor is naked."' 20 In fact, to the extent that public charities partner with the
government in providing certain services to the public, it makes sense to
"permit the charitable sector to participate in the process of choosing its
governmental 'partners."'l21
Proponents of the ban on campaigning do not necessarily deny public
charities' history of political activity or the important role they can continue
to play. The prohibition on campaigning does not, they argue, prevent public
charities from "discussing important issues of the day." 2 2 Public charities are
not prohibited from engaging in the political debates of the day, including
debates over how the government should be run; rather, they are prohibited
from saying who should run it.123 Within these more-limited constraints, public
charities are free to continue to influence public policy.

117. See Richard W. Garnett, A Quiet Faith?Taxes, Politics,and the Privatizationof Religion, 42
B.C. L. REv. 771, 779-80 (2001).
118. Buckles, supra note 56, at 1096.
119. See Clark, supra note 52, at 458-59.
120. Thomas L. Schafer, Stephen Carter and Religion in America, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1601, 1604
(1994) (reviewing STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS
TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 1993).
121. Buckles, supranote 56, at 1096.
122. Tobin, supra note 56, at 1334.
123. Id.
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3. Public CharitiesMust Be Able to Fully Protect Their Self-Interest
Although they are intended to serve the public, some commentators point
out that public charities need the ability to protect their own self-interest. 124
Public charities are subject to governmental laws and regulations and, without
a representative voice in the political world, they risk getting captured by
government in much the same way that some proponents of the prohibition
worry that, should they be permitted to support individual candidates, they risk
being captured by large donors. Banning public charities from the political
world would prevent them from "defend[ing] their operations, and indeed their
very existence, against hostile acts by government agents."l 25 Both because of
the good that public charities can do in the public arena and because of the
potential harms they would face if they were not permitted to act politically,
expanding the prohibition to cover all of a public charity's potential political
actions is neither a viable nor a good solution.
Supporters of the ban on campaigning reply, again, that even with the
prohibition, public charities can protect themselves in the public sphere.126
Moreover, they argue that intervention in political campaigns by a public
charity is actually harmful to the charity.127 There is limited value in a public
charity's being able to protect its interests in the political realm if the cost of
such protection harms or destroys the public charity.
C. Summary
In spite of the lack of a discernable normative justification underlying the
original enactment of the campaigning prohibition, there are clearly strong
arguments for preventing public charities from campaigning. However, just as
clearly there are strong countervailing arguments that the prohibition should
not exist. Moreover, all of the arguments on both sides are flawed and
rebuttable. Ultimately, the debate fails to result in ajustification that absolutely
compels the IRS to enforce the prohibition, irrespective of the penalty's
severity.

124. Buckles, supra note 56, at 1097 ("[O]ne may argue that charities should be permitted to defend
their operations, and indeed their very existence, against hostile acts by government agents.").
125. Id.
126. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
127. Tobin, supra note 56, at 1338 ("Moreover, charities that support political candidates may find
it harder to obtain funds and donations from outside sources.").
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IV. ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS
The last half-century has demonstrated that the existence of the
campaigning prohibition has not been fatal to public charities' pursuit of their
charitable purposes.128 But although public charities have been able to function
in a world where they operate subject to the prohibition, anecdotal evidence
suggests that many have been acting as if there was no such prohibition. And
the IRS has been hesitant in its attempts to identify and penalize public
charities that violate the prohibition. So although public charities appear to be
coexisting with the prohibition successfully, this coexistence exists, at least in
part, because in many cases, public charities are able to operate as if there were
no prohibition. But the disregard by some public charities of the prohibition
impacts other public charities negatively.
A. Public Charities Often Disregardthe Prohibition
In spite of the prohibition, public charities endorse or oppose candidates
on a relatively regular basis.129
The 2008 election saw widespread questions about whether thenpresidential-candidate Barack Obama's church should have its exemption
revoked because of a sermon by Rev. Jeremiah Wright in which Rev. Wright
appeared to oppose Senator Hillary Clinton's bid for the presidency.'3 0 On the
other side of the political spectrum, the Alliance Defense Fund sponsored
"Pulpit Freedom Sunday." On September 28, 2008, thirty-three pastors used
their sermons to endorse a candidate for office, in express contravention of the
prohibition. The churches did not try to surreptitiously violate the campaigning
prohibition: Pulpit Freedom Sunday received prominent nationwide news

128. Butsee Kay Guinane, Wanted:A Bright-Line TestDefiningProhibitedInterventionin Elections
by 501 (c)(3) Organizations,6 FIRST AMEND. L. REv. 142, 143 (2007) (arguing that the Help America Vote
Act of 2002 and the IRS's changed enforcement procedures of 2004 and 2006 increase the problems caused
by the prohibition).
129. See O'Daniel, supra note 38, at 736-39 (listing eighteen incidents of churches being used to
endorse or oppose a candidate during the 2000 presidential election).
130. Howard Kurtz, A Complex Speech, BoiledDown to Simple Politics,WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 2008,
at COI ("Fox Chicago correspondent Jeff Goldblatt says he was looking into whether Obama's Trinity
United Church of Christ deserved its tax-exempt status. In his report on Wednesday, March 12, he played
a clip of Wright saying that the country is 'controlled by rich white people' and that Hillary Clinton 'ain't
never been called a [N-word]."'); see also Keith S. Blair, Prayingfor a Tax Break: Churches, Political
Speech, andthe Loss ofSection 501(c)(3) Tax Exempt Status, 86 DENv. U. L. REv. 405,405 (2009) ("More
importantly for purposes of this piece, Reverend Wright put his church's tax-exempt status in jeopardy with
this sermon.").
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coverage."' Moreover, because the pastors intended their sermons as a
challenge to the prohibition, they sent copies of their sermons to the IRS.' 32
In the face of this blatant disregard for the campaigning prohibition, as of
April 2009, the IRS had not notified any of the churches that it had opened an
investigation. Nor had the IRS made any other move to sanction any of the
churches."' And, in fact, it appears that the IRS rarely revokes a public
charity's tax-exempt status for violating the prohibition. In 2004, the IRS
launched the Political Activities Compliance Initiative (PACI), in which it
reviewed 110 cases of alleged impermissible campaigning by public
charities.134 About 57% of the organizations examined were nonchurch public
charities, while the other 43% were churches."' As of the date of the report,
the IRS had closed 82 of the 110 cases. 1 6 In 18 of the 82 closed examinations,
the IRS determined that the public charity had not violated the campaign
prohibition."' In another 53, the IRS determined that they had violated the
prohibition, but it did not revoke the public charity's tax-exempt status or
impose an excise tax.1 8 Instead, the IRS "issu[ed] a closing letter that stated
the circumstances leading to the examination, the examination findings, and
the reasons for resolving the examination without change to the organization's
exempt status.""' In three cases, the IRS imposed an excise tax,140 and in only
four cases-none of which involved a church-did the IRS revoke a public
charity's tax-exempt status.14 1 In only one court case has a church lost its taxexempt status as a result of campaigning for or against a candidate.'42
131. See, e.g., Laurie Goodstein, Ministers to Defy I.R.S. by Endorsing Candidates,N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 26, 2008, at A20; Duke Helfand, Politics in the Pulpit at Issue; Complaints to IRS Are Welcomed by
PastorsWhoAreDefyingBan, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3,2008, at B2; DineshRamde,ProtestingPastorsEndorse
from Pulpit;Backing CandidatesInvites a Legal Fight, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 29, 2008, at C1O; Paul Vitello,
Pastors' Web ElectioneeringAttracts US. Reviews of Tax Exemptions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3,2008, at BI;
All Things Considered: Pastors Protest from the Pulpit, (NPR radio broadcast Sept. 28, 2008),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=95149057.
132. Goodstein, supra note 131.
133. No Wordfrom I.R.S. on Protestby Pastors,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2009, at A19.
134. I.R.S., FINAL REPORT, PROJECT 302: POLITICAL ACTIVITIES COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE 1, 3, 7

(2006), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/finalpaci report.pdf.
135. Id at 9.
136. Id. at 18.
137. Id. at 18-19.
138. Id.
139. Id.at 19.
140. Id
141. Louis Sahagun, Church Votes to FightFederalProbe; Pasadena'sAll SaintsEpiscopalParish
BoardChallengesa Request to Turn over Documents in a Case over a 2004 Antiwar Sermon, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 22, 2006, at Bl.
142. Blair, supranote 130, at 428.

HeinOnline -- 8 Pitt. Tax Rev. 151 2010-2011

152

PITTSBURGH TAX REVIEW

[Vol. 8:125

B. The IRS Does Not Enforce the Prohibition
The IRS, the agency charged with enforcing the prohibition, has largely
ignored its responsibility to do so. There may be legitimate reasons why the
IRS is hesitant to enforce the campaigning prohibition. Although the
prohibition has been a part of the tax law for over fifty years, there is still
broad disagreement about whether public charities should be permitted to
campaign.14 Notwithstanding this disagreement, the penalty for campaigning
is draconian, even where the infraction is minor or unintentional. In theory, a
public charity must lose its tax exemption for a single instance of supporting
a candidate.
In exploring the enforcement of legal norms, Professor Kahan argues that
"[t]he decisive factor in determining whether a norm will inhibit enforcement
... is how much more severely the law condemns the behavior than does the
typical decisionmaker."'" He argues that where the law condemns a behavior
much more severely than does society broadly, those charged with enforcing
the law are reluctant to do so, whereas if the law condemns the behavior only
a little more than society at large, those charged with enforcing the law are
more likely to do so.'4 5
Professor Kahan grounds his theory of gentle nudges in a model that bears
an uncanny resemblance to the current state of the prohibition:
Imagine a society whose members are divided about how to regard some form of
behavior that reflects a contested social norm. Many regard the behavior as perfectly
appropriate or as at most a trifling wrong. Others vehemently denounce it and demand
that it be severely sanctioned, both to deter individuals from engaging in it and to change
the social norm that gives rise to it. A significant group of citizens falls somewhere in
between. Against the will of those who condone the behavior, those intent on denouncing
it prevail in obtaining legislation that prohibits the behavior or, assuming it is already
subject to modest regulation, substantially raises the penalty for it.
What will happen next? That depends, I will argue, on exactly how severely the new
law condemns the behavior relative to the sensibilities of the decisionmakers who are
called upon to enforce it. If the law condemns too severely-if it tries to break the grip
of the contested norm (and the will of its supporters) with a "hard shove"-it will likely
prove a dead letter and could even backfire. If it condemns more mildly-if it "gently
nudges" citizens toward the desired behavior and attitudes-it might well initiate a

143. See supraPart II.
144. Kahan, supranote 9, at 608.
145. Id.
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process that culminates in the near eradication of the contested norm and the associated
types of behavior."

Like Professor Kahan's model, there are two outspoken groups, the supporters
and the critics of the prohibition, while most people presumably fall
somewhere between the extreme poles that the two groups represent. With
such polarized opinions, though, it becomes especially valuable to provide the
IRS, which is charged with enforcing the prohibition, the tools necessary to
gently nudge public charities. In that way, it will be more likely to enforce the
prohibition.
Even with the explicit authority to nudge, rather than shove, public
charities, the IRS starts at a disadvantage. When the IRS initiates
investigations of public charities, it is often met with cries of bias, or
complaints that it is trying to bully the Administration's opponents. 14 7
Moreover, analyzing a public charity's actions and statements in order to
determine whether the public charity has engaged in proscribed behaviors is
administratively burdensome, potentially requiring significant investments of
time and financial resources by the IRS. And the upside to the IRS is minimal:
presumably, revoking a public charity's tax-exempt status, while preventing
bad behavior, will not result in significant additional revenue for the
government. If the public charity is a church, it will regain its tax exemption
immediately upon ending its support of a candidate. Other public charities
would presumably cease to operate and, to the extent they intended to
continue, would form a new entity and apply for public charity status for that
entity.
The IRS's hesitance to penalize violators limits the effectiveness of the
current penalty regime in another way. Although the penalty is severe as
applied to any individual public charity, ex ante, any given charity faces a very
low expected penalty. A public charity's expected penalty for violating the
campaigning prohibition is the nominal penalty (i.e., loss of exemption)
discounted by the probability of the penalty's being imposed. 148 Although this
Article has used examples of highly publicized noncompliance by public
charities, noncompliance of which the IRS has been aware, it appears that
there is a sizeable amount of noncompliance of which the IRS is
146. Id. at 609.

147. Such complaints are not entirely without merit: the Nixon administration used information
provided by the IRS in order to "harass and intimidate political opponents." Joseph J.Darby, Confidentiality
and the Law of Taxation, 46 AM. J. CoMP. L. 577, 579 (1998).
148. Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the SelfAdjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569, 576 (2006).
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unaware. 149And even if it were willing to revoke the tax exemption of every
public charity that violated the campaigning prohibition, the IRS cannot
penalize violations of which it is unaware. 50 To the extent public charities
believe they will not be caught, even the most stringent penalty has a low
expected cost. If enforced, the expected penalty may be enough to prevent
public charities from blatant disregard, but may be insufficient to encourage
public charities to actively avoid small and inadvertent violations that are
unlikely to be found.
In addition, as has been discussed, because of the devastating effect of the
penalty for noncompliance, there may be strong political and practical reasons
not to enforce the prohibition except in truly egregious cases.'"' To step up the
enforcement of the prohibition would, moreover, require the IRS to spend
more time and money on enforcement. But the IRS is already doing more work
with fewer employees and fewer resources.'5 2 Improving its enforcement of the
campaigning prohibition would require the IRS to shift resources that it
currently deploys in other ways. But government's return on shifting scarce
IRS resources toward enforcing the prohibition is unlikely to raise any
significant revenue for the government; churches will not become taxable and,
presumably, other public charities will cease to operate or otherwise shift their
behavior to minimize or eliminate their tax liabilities as quickly as possible."'
C. Lack of Compliance by Some Public CharitiesHarms All Public
Charities
This noncompliance by some public charities is bad for charities in
general. It can distort public charities' actions. In some cases, a public charity
may become paranoid, worried that any political action may lead to the loss

149. See, e.g., Mayer, supranote 8, at 13-15.
150. See Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive Us Crazy, and How We
Can Make Them Sane, 16 VA. TAX REv. 155, 206 (1996) ("Unfortunately, the Service is likely to detect
noncompliance only when it has access to tax-relevant information.... In addition, the Service's own
attempts to find what others have hidden have often proven more likely to provoke resentment than to
provoke honesty.").
151. "A law that cannot be enforced is a bad law." Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Case Against Taxing
Citizens, 127 TAX NOTES 680, 684 (2010).
152. See Stephanie Hunter McMahon, To Haveandto Hold: What DoesLove (ofMoney) Have to Do
with Joint Tax Filing?,10 NEV. L.J. (forthcoming spring 2011) ("With all of these demands, it should not
be surprising that there is not enough money [for the IRS] to do everything that needs to be done.").
153. See, e.g., Carroll,supra note 4, at 219 n.9 ("As commentators have pointed out, revocation of
charitable status is far more likely to result in a dead organization than in a taxable one.").
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of its tax exemption.'54 Such a paranoid public charity is likely to restrict its
behavior more than the tax law requires, and miss the chance to do some
things that are permissible and would further its exempt purpose. Other public
charities, on the other hand, may simply ignore the prohibition, knowing that
it is unlikely to be enforced.' 5 Even where there is no distortion of public
charities' behavior as a result of the underenforcement of the prohibition,
public charities are likely to be careless, violating the prohibition in small or
in accidental ways if they know the prohibition is unlikely to be enforced.156
Professor Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer lays out a number of problems with such
noncompliance by public charities. It is possible, for example, that
noncompliance among public charities could be contagious. That is, if public
charities see other public charities engaged in campaigning, it may create a
"culture of noncompliance."' Public charities that are already noncompliant
may be encouraged by the lack of enforcement to continue, or even broaden,
their noncompliance, while previously compliant public charities may reduce
their perception of the risk of violating the prohibition.' It may be, too, that
a public charity's support of a candidate will have a disproportionate effect on
the electorate, as a result of the goodwill that public charities have.' Even if,
however, public charities do not have a disproportionate influence, and even
if noncompliance is not contagious, the public perception that charities are
flouting the law may damage the reputation of both individual charities and the
charitable sector in general. 6 o
In spite of the blatant disregard for the campaigning prohibition evinced
by many public charities, the IRS does not enforce the prohibition. Knowing
that the prohibition will not be enforced frees other public charities to
campaign. And the continual violation of the prohibition harms public charities
in general. Nonetheless, as long as the penalty for violating the prohibition is
as severe as it currently is, the IRS is unlikely to begin to enforce the
prohibition robustly. In order to end the cycle of violation, the IRS needs the
tools to gently nudge public charities toward compliance.

154. Steffen N. Johnson, OfPoliticsandPulpits: A FirstAmendment Analysis ofIRS Restrictionson
the PoliticalActivities ofReligious Organizations,42 B.C. L. REv. 875, 899 (2001) ("Other churches, by
contrast, are always looking over their shoulder, for fear that any political activity will place them in
violation of the Code and at risk of losing their tax-exempt status.").
155. Id
156. See Mayer, supra note 8, at 17.
157. Id. at 20.
158. Id. at 19-20.
159. Id. at 22-23.
160. Id. at 24.

HeinOnline -- 8 Pitt. Tax Rev. 155 2010-2011

156

PITTSBURGH TAX REVIEW

[Vol. 8:125

V. INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS FOR PUBLIC CHARITIES
THAT ENGAGE INCAMPAIGNING

Although revocation of a public charity's tax exemption is an extreme
penalty, it has not prevented widespread violation of the campaigning
prohibition. Providing the IRS with the explicit option, in appropriate
circumstances, to gently nudge public charities toward compliance by
imposing a properly designed intermediate penalty would lower the IRS's
inclination to not enforce the prohibition. As the IRS actually imposed
sanctions, the expected penalty would increase. A higher expected penalty, in
turn, would likely reduce noncompliance by public charities.
An intermediate penalty should be designed to meet a number of criteria.
It needs to be administrable, fair, comprehensible, and effective."' In order for
it to be fair, the intermediate penalty needs to have some proportionate relation
to the violation; for example, a one-time inadvertent statement in favor of a
candidate should be punished less harshly than a repeated and deliberate
endorsement.'62 And the IRS should have limited discretion with respect to the
size of the penalty, in order to avoid a perception that the IRS is biased in its
administration of the penalty.' 63
A. CurrentIntermediatePenalty Regimes Applicable to Public Charities
The rules governing tax-exempt entities already include intermediate
penalties in some situations. For example, if certain tax-exempt organizations
engage in transactions that unduly benefit directors, employees, or certain
other people, called "excess benefit transactions," the beneficiary owes a tax
of 25% of the excess benefit and, in certain situations, the management may

161. Richard J. Wood, Accuracy-Related Penalties:A Questionof Values, 76 IOWA L. REv. 309, 320
(1991).
162. Generally, penalties for noncompliance with the tax law "change based on two variables:
aggressiveness of a particular avoidance transaction and its absolute size." Raskolnikov, supra note 148,
at 580.
163. See, e.g., Eric R. Swibel, Conunent, Churchesand CampaignIntervention: Why the Tax Man
Is Right and How Congress Can Improve His Reputation, 57 EMORY L.J. 1605, 1642 (2008) ("The
continuous flow of claims accusing the IRS of politically biased enforcement reflects weaknesses in the
Code.").
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also owe an excise tax of 10%.'6 "The intermediate sanction provisions create
an intermediate step between revoking exempt status and no sanction at all."'
The Code also contains an excise tax applicable to public charities that
participate in political campaigns. The excise tax requires a public charity to
pay to the government 10% of the amount it spent campaigning. 6 6 In addition,
there may be a 22% excise tax on a culpable manager who knowingly causes
the public charity to make a proscribed expenditure.' 6 1 If the public charity
fails to correct the political expenditure, it will owe an additional excise tax
equal to 100% of the political expenditure, and a culpable manager may be
required to pay an additional 50% excise tax. 6 1
In addition, if the public charity's campaigning is a "flagrant violation of
the prohibition against making political expenditures," the IRS can make a
determination of the income and excise taxes payable by the public charity.'
The IRS's income tax assessment may go back as of the date the public
charity's tax-exempt status was revoked,' 70 and the public charity must pay the
income and excise taxes assessed within ten days of the assessment."' The IRS
may also, under certain circumstances, seek an injunction against a public
charity that is flagrantly violating the campaigning prohibition.'72
In its current form, though, this excise tax is not an intermediate penalty.
Under current law, the excise tax is imposed in addition to a public charity's
loss of its tax exemption. In the preamble to the regulations promulgated under
these three sections, the Treasury Department wrote,
According to the statutory language and the legislative history of section 4955, the

addition of that section to the Internal Revenue Code did not affect the substantive
standards for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3). To be exempt from income tax as
an organization described in section 501(c)(3), an organization may not intervene in any
political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office. Consistent with this

164. I.R.C. § 4958(a), (c).
165. L. Edward Bryant, Jr., ResponsibilitiesofDirectors ofNot-for-ProfitCorporationsFacedwith
Sharing Control with Other Nonprofit Organizationsin Health Industry Affiliations: A Commentary on
Legal and PracticalRealities,7 ANNALS HEALTH L. 139, 148 (1998).
166. I.R.C. §4955(a)(1).
167. Id. §4955(a)(2).
168. Id. § 4955(b). In order to correct its political expenditure, a public charity must recover the
expenditure to the extent possible, as well as establish safeguards in order to prevent future political
expenditures. Id. §4955(f)(3).
169. Id. §6852(a).
170. Treas. Reg. § 301.6852-1(b) (1995).
171. Id. § 301.6852-1(c).
172. I.R.C. § 7409(a).

HeinOnline -- 8 Pitt. Tax Rev. 157 2010-2011

PITTSBURGH TAX REVIEW

158

[Vol. 8:125

requirement, section 4955 does not permit a de minimis amount of political
intervention."

The preamble goes on to assert that, in some circumstances, "based on the
facts and circumstances such as the nature of the political intervention and the
measures that have been taken by the organization to prevent a recurrence," the
IRS may have discretion to impose the excise tax without revoking the public
charity's exemption.174 The IRS appears to believe that it has this discretion,'
but, notwithstanding the IRS's belief, the Treasury Department declined to
provide for such discretion in the published regulations.'7 1
Even if the IRS were given discretion to impose the excise tax in lieu of
revoking a public charity's tax exemption, it would not effectively improve the
IRS's policing of political activity. In the first instance, not all campaigning
involves giving money to organizations supporting candidates. Campaigning
can also include an endorsement by a pastor speaking to her congregation, a
university president's public support of a candidate, publishing an
endorsement in a newsletter that would be printed anyway, posting an
endorsement on an organization's website, or even sending spain emails.17 7
None of these involve significant marginal cost to the public charity, and so
none would result in a penalty sufficient to discourage public charities from
supporting or opposing candidates.
In addition, while making the excise tax available to the IRS as an
intermediate sanction would potentially diminish the IRS's unwillingness to
enforce the campaigning prohibition, it would do nothing to help the IRS
substantively enforce the prohibition. "The IRS functions best when engaged
in its core function-collecting revenue and protecting the fisc. It has no
special expertise in the regulation of elections, and it has neither the staff nor

173. Preamble, Political Expenditures by § 501(c)(3) Organizations, 60 Fed. Reg. 62,209 (Dec. 5,
1995).
174. Id.
175. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
176. Preamble, supra note 173. Although the IRS acts as if it has the authority to impose a penalty
on public charities that violate the campaigning prohibition in lieu of revoking their exemption, I believe
it is better to provide them that authority explicitly, rather than maintain the requirement that the exemption
be revoked but tacitly allow the IRS to impose a less-severe sanction.
177. See, e.g., Gregory D. Baird, Comment, IndependentInstitutions offHigher EducationandI.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3): Guidelinesfor Conducting Political Campaign Activities on Campus, 49 BAYLORL. REV. 129,
134-35 ("Suppose, for example, that the IRS found that a college president had violated the political
campaign activity prohibition by endorsing the Republican candidate for President of the United States
during a ten minute interview on the local college radio station. Should the college lose its tax-exempt
status?").
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the expertise to engage adequately in this function.""' There is no reason to
believe that just because Congress granted it an additional tool in its arsenal,
the IRS would suddenly become better positioned to police public charities'
political actions."'
B. A New Tool for Enforcement
In order to meet the goals of both discouraging public charities from
participating in political campaigns and improving the IRS's ability to enforce
the prohibition, I propose that Congress implement a penalty that is designed
differently than current penalties, one that can be imposed on tax-exempt
organizations. Instead of penalizing the public charity, the tax law should
disallow a portion of the deduction taken by donors to the public charity that
campaigned on behalf of or against any individual.
This approach solves a number of problems with the current regime. First,
it is less draconian. The amount of the penalty is set with respect to the
culpability of the bad behavior. And because the penalty disallows a portion
of the amount taxpayers can deduct, its enforcement raises revenue, which
should encourage the IRS to enforce the penalty.
In addition, it ultimately reduces the pressure on the IRS to police public
charities' political speech. Because the deductibility of donations is at issue,
donors to the public charity have the incentive to make sure that the public
charity does not violate the campaigning prohibition. If the public charity does
campaign for or against a candidate for office, all of the donors during the year
will lose a portion of their exemption, not just donors who donate after the
public charity's exemption is revoked.
1. Calculatingthe IntermediatePenalty
The campaigning prohibition presents unusual challenges for the design
of penalties. The prohibition has very little to do with the government's
collection of taxes; instead, the prohibition is intended to regulate a public
charity's nontax behavior. Moreover, a public charity's violation may be more
culpable even if the violation involves a smaller percentage of the public
charity's assets than a violation by a smaller public charity. As such, a penalty

178. Tobin, supra note 56, at 1318.
179. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 8, at 16 ("This limited evidence ... suggests, however, that there
are significantly more violations occurring than the IRS has detected and pursued.").
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determined solely as a percentage of the public charity's expenditures in
supporting a candidate is both difficult to design and flawed at its inception.
This difficulty may contribute to the fact that no substantive changes have
occurred with what amounts to the current regime.
In order to meet the regulatory aims of the campaigning prohibition, the
intermediate penalty should be designed differently than other penalties in the
Code. Rather than penalizing the public charity as a proportion of its
expenditures, the intermediate penalty would disallow a percentage of donors'
charitable deductions. In order to effectively deter both high-cost and low-cost
campaigning, each donor's deduction would be reduced by the greater of
(a) the percentage of the public charity's expenditures that went toward
campaigning, or (b) a percentage calculated by the size of the audience toward
which the political speech was directed.
In general, the first number will apply when public charities endorse
candidates using an expensive medium. Depending on the size of the public
charity, purchasing an ad in a newspaper or on television, or mailing
pamphlets, may consume a substantial portion of its annual budget.
Calculating the percentage of the public charity's expenditures that went
toward campaigning is straightforward enough; conceptually, this aspect ofthe
penalty is similar to the excise tax that can already be imposed on public
charities.'s A public charity would be required to determine the total amount
of its expenditures for the year and the total amount it spent campaigning on
behalf of and against candidates for office, and divide the second number by
the first.'"'
In some situations, however, a public charity could endorse a candidate
at a low cost, relative to its other expenditures. Email, for example, is virtually
costless and, if the organization is large enough, even purchasing television
advertising that reaches a broad audience may not constitute a significant
percentage of its annual expenditures.182 In order to discourage these low-

180. See supraPart V.A.
181. In practice, this calculation may not be as straightforward as adding up a list of checks. There
is a value, for example, to a public charity's provision of its mailing list, even where there is no marginal
cost to the public charity of providing the list. See, e.g., Galle, supra note 58, at 374-75. Determining the
amount of expenditures would be a matter of accounting rather than of bookkeeping. Although such
valuation may be difficult, though, it is possible; moreover, because the aim of the intermediate penalty is
prophylactic rather than revenue raising, knowing that the calculation will impose an administrative burden
may help prevent public charities from providing such difficult-to-value support.
182. For example, the New York Times estimates that the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation spends
more than $3 billion annually on its various charitable pursuits. Andrew Jacobs, H.I. V. Tests Turn Blood into
Cash in China, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2009, at A6. In 2009, a 30-second ad during the Super Bowl cost up to
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marginal-cost endorsements, the intermediate penalty needs to be able to
disallow a significant percentage of donors' deductions even where the public
charity does not spend a significant amount of money.
In order to capture low-marginal-cost endorsements, then, a public charity
would have to determine two numbers. First, it would need to know how many
people had donated money to it during the year. Second, it would have to
determine the number of people to whom the endorsement was directed. In
order to calculate the percentage of donors' deductions that would be
disallowed, it would again divide the second number by the first.
Determining the number of donors during the year is relatively simple.
Public charities already generally keep records of their donors, and the
intermediate penalty would provide additional incentive for them to keep those
records.' Provided the public charity has those records, quantifying the
donors should be simple.
Determining the number ofpeople to whom the endorsement was directed
is slightly more complicated, if only because the methodology would vary
depending on the medium used by the charity. A series of examples helps
illustrate how it would work, though. If a pastor endorsed a candidate during
a sermon, the people to whom the endorsement was directed would be those
in the congregation. If a university bought an ad in the New York Times, the
number of people to whom it was directed would be the circulation of the New
York Times. If the public charity sent a blast email, the number of people to
whom it was directed would be the number of emails it sent.
Using the number of donors as the denominator has both theoretical and
practical problems. Theoretically, there is no relationship between the number
of donors a public charity has and the number of people to whom it addresses
its endorsement. It would make more sense, for example, to calculate the
number of people who were at the sermon as a percentage of the church's total
congregation. But while that would work in the church/sermon context, it is
impossible to determine the appropriate denominator for a newspaper ad or an
email blast. The number of donors is a determinable number, and it can stay
consistent across the various media by which a public charity could endorse
a candidate.

$3 million and reached an estimated 100 million people. Stuart Elliott, Super Bowl Sales as Economic
Indicator,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2010, at B7. If the penalty were determined solely as a percentage of annual
expenditures, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation could encourage 100 million people to vote for a
candidate, and donors would only lose 0.1% of their deduction.
183. See infra notes 200-05 and accompanying text.
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It is also possible for the number of people to whom the endorsement is
directed to exceed the number of donors, creating a disallowance of more than
100% of donors' deductions. Because this is mathematically possible, the
intermediate penalty would cap the disallowance at 100%.
It is also important that the intermediate penalty only be applied as a result
of violative acts of the public charity. It would be unfair to increase the penalty
if, for example, a pastor's endorsement to a small congregation were
surreptitiously recorded by a congregant, and placed on the internet or sent to
news outlets without the public charity's knowledge or permission.
Disallowing up to 100% of donors' charitable deductions should prevent
the penalty from crossing the line separating gentle nudges from hard shoves.
Professor Kahan explains that penalties must be "sufficiently severe to avoid
being construed as tacit endorsements . . . but sufficiently mild to avoid

coming across as morally fanatical."' 84 The loss of a percentage of donors'
deductions is a real penalty-it requires donors to pay more taxes than they
had intended to pay. But the ultimate amount of additional taxes they must pay
is capped at the amount they previously deducted. Deductions are "a matter of
legislative grace,"' and, although losing the deduction stings, it should not
come across as draconian.
These tests can be gamed, of course. A public charity could, for example,
send out an email endorsing a candidate to a single person, knowing that the
recipient would forward the email to a much larger group. Under this
intermediate penalty regime, if there was insufficient evidence to characterize
the intermediary as an agent of the public charity, the single email would
create a negligible deduction disallowance. But the intermediate penalty is not
the only penalty in the IRS's quiver: it would still be able to revoke the public
charity's tax exemption. Structuring an endorsement in a manner intended to
avoid the penalty demonstrates awareness of the rule and a deliberate intent to
avoid the rule. In that case, it may be more palatable to the IRS to revoke the
charity's exemption. And because the IRS would have such a powerful
ultimate penalty, it would curtail the need for new regulations to respond to
each new attempt by public charities to circumvent the prohibition."

184. Kahan, supra note 9, at 641.
185. Interstate Transit Lines v. Comm'r, 319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943).
186. Cf Samuel D. Brunson, Elective Taxation ofRisk-Based FinancialInstruments:A Proposal,8
Hous. Bus. & TAX L.J. 1, 9 (2007) ("The necessity of creating a new taxing regime for each financial
instrument suffers from two major problems: it increases the complexity of the Code, and because there is
a lag between the introduction of an instrument and its tax classification, it creates inefficiencies.").
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2. Imposing the Intermediate Penalty
Where this penalty varies most radically from other proposed penalties is
in its incidence. If the IRS determined that a public charity had engaged in
prohibited campaigning during the year that merited the intermediate penalty,
the IRS would not fine the public charity itself. Instead, it would require the
public charity to send a notice to its donors from the year of the violation,
informing them of the percentage of their donation that would not be
deductible. Donors would then be required to file an amended return and that
percentage of the donor's charitable deduction would be disallowed.'87
Effectively, the intermediate penalty would increase each donor's taxable
income for the year. In addition, the public charity would be required to inform
the IRS of its donors for the year, the amount of their donations, and the
percentage of the donations that were disallowed.' 88
At first glance, penalizing donors for the public charity's noncompliance
appears unfair. The donors, after all, did not force the public charity to endorse
a candidate; it is reasonable to assume, moreover, that at least some of them
donated to the public charity before the prohibited campaigning occurred, and
therefore could not have known, when making their deduction, that the public
charity would violate the campaigning prohibition. But there is no
constitutional requirement that taxpayers know in advance the tax
consequences of their actions. Courts have determined that, provided the
legislature's decision is rational, it can change tax laws retroactively, even
where taxpayers have no prior notice of the change."' In the case of the

187. It may be necessary to make explicit the requirement that donors file an amended return.
Currently, the Treasury regulations say that "[i]f a taxpayer ascertains that an item should have been
included in gross income in a prior taxable year, he should... file an amended return and pay any additional
tax due." Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a) (as amended in 1999) (emphasis added). The Tax Court has held that the
regulations impose a duty to file an amended return. Unvert v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 807, 818 (1979). However,
it is not clear that the Tax Court is correct. See, e.g., P.H. Glatfelter Co. v. Lewis, 746 F. Supp. 511, 519 n.23
(E.D. Pa. 1990) (citing the "presumed fact that the taxpayer is not mandated to amend his return").
Mandating that donors who receive notice from public charities file amended returns would obviate any
confusion.
188. Presumably, such notice could be designed in a manner similar to the IRS's various Forms 1099,
on which payors inform payees and the IRS of the amount of payments made to the payee during the year.
See Sarah B. Lawsky, Fairly Random: On CompensatingAudited Taxpayers, 41 CONN. L. REv. 161, 188
(2008) ("The tax code requires certain payors to submit forms to the IRS stating how much was paid and
to whom. For example ... a bank paying interest must submit a Form 1099-INT to the IRS, with a copy to
the depositor.").
189. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 30-31 (1994) ("The due process standard to be applied
to tax statutes with retroactive effect, therefore, is the same as that generally applicable to retroactive
economic legislation .... .").
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intermediate penalty, there would be no change in the tax law. Donors would
be on notice, when they donated to a public charity, that a portion of their
donation could be disallowed.
Disallowing a portion of donors' deductions provides a number of
advantages over fining the public charity itself. Principal among those
advantages is that it strongly discourages public charities from violating the
provision. If a public charity feels strongly enough about a candidate, it may
be willing to risk a fine and, if it feels the chances of losing its exemption are
sufficiently small, may even be willing to risk losing its exemption. But if its
actions may increase its donors' tax bills, violating the campaigning
prohibition risks alienating its donors.
Disallowing a portion of the charitable deduction also yields roughly the
same amount of revenue that the government would have received had the
donors donated to the politician rather than through a public charity.190 As
such, it eliminates any funneling problem. The pro rata share of each donor's
donations that go to campaigning is disallowed as a deduction, eliminating any
double subsidy that would be available by donating through a public charity.
The proposed intermediate sanction would also be progressive. Many
commentators take issue with the regressivity of the charitable deduction; the
deduction is worth more to higher-income taxpayers than it is to lower-income
taxpayers.' 9 1 But the reverse is also true: the denial of a deduction is more
costly to a higher-income taxpayer than to a lower-income taxpayer. 192
What's more, the proposal would not impact a large number of lowerincome taxpayers. To be able to deduct a contribution to a public charity, and
therefore to be able to have part of the deduction disallowed, a donor would
have to elect to itemize her deductions.' The Joint Committee on Taxation
estimates that, in 2010, only about 36% of taxpayers will itemize their
deductions. And the likelihood that any taxpayer itemizes increases almost

190. I say "roughly" because it is possible that only the highest-income (or lowest-income) donors
would have donated directly to the candidate, and thus the additional tax revenues would be greater or less
than the amount the government would have actually received.
191. See, e.g., Alice Gresham Bullock, Taxes, Social Policy, and Philanthropy: The Untapped
PotentialofMiddle- andLow-Income Generosity,6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 325, 330 (1997) ("The cost
of giving to charity becomes cheaper ... as the taxpayer's income rises .... ).
192. Imagine two taxpayers, one of whorn is in the 10% tax bracket and the other in the 35% tax
bracket. Each taxpayer has $100 of deductions disallowed. For the 10% taxpayer, the disallowance means
she will pay an additional $10 in taxes. The 35% taxpayer, on the other hand, will pay an additional $35 in
taxes.
193. Bullock, supra note 191, at 330 ("[T]axpayers must be able to itemize in order to take the
charitable deduction.").
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exponentially as income increases: only 11.1% of taxpayers earning between
$20,000 and $30,000 itemize, while 65.3% of taxpayers earning between
$75,000 and $100,000 and 91% of taxpayers earning $1 million or more
itemize.'94 Because many lower-income taxpayers could not have deducted
their donation in the first place, the intermediate penalty will not increase their
tax burden.
In addition to strongly discouraging public charities from violating the
prohibition, the intermediate sanction would encourage donors to help enforce
the prohibition, reducing the IRS's burden and increasing the likelihood that
a public charity's violation of the prohibition will be caught.'95 It may be that,
even without structuring the penalty to induce donors to enforce the
prohibition, the IRS would be more motivated to enforce the prohibition, both
because the penalty is less politically unsavory and because imposing the
penalty will provide revenue for the government. Even if the revenue raised
through enforcement were insufficient to tempt the IRS into active
enforcement, however, donors would have an incentive to police the public
charities to which they donate.'96

194. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 11I TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND DATA
RELATED TO THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME AND SOCIAL INSURANCE TAXES AS IN EFFECT FOR 2010 AND 2011,
at 23 (Comm. Print 2010).
195. Cf Rosenberg, supranote 150, at 206 ("The cause of tax enforcement would be well served by
changing the system so we rely on neither the taxpayer nor the Service to report or discover the facts, but
instead look to those who, unlike the Service, already have direct access to tax-relevant information and,
unlike the taxpayer, have no inherent self-interest in concealing it.").
196. Admittedly, the fact that the IRS would have to pursue multiple donors, rather than a single taxexempt entity, would create more work than merely fining or disqualifying the public charity. The additional
work would not be overwhelming, however. The IRS Oversight Board says that "one of the most effective
ways to increase enforcement is to increase document matching with information reporting. The board said
well-administered matching programs 'have a large deterrent effect' and produce direct revenue." Michael
Joe, Oversight Board Report Provides Preview of IRS Strategic Plan, 123 TAX NOTES 284, 285 (2009).
Already, the IRS's "domestic information return matching programs make the most efficient use of
enforcement resources." Thomas D. Greenaway, Worldwide Taxation, Worldwide Enforcement, 123 TAX
NOTES 561, 561 (2009). The enforcement would allow the IRS to do what it is designed to do: enforce tax
provisions and collect revenue. If, however, Congress were to determine that the intermediate penalty still
placed too heavy a burden on the IRS, it could expand the whistleblower award to persons who provide
actionable information to the IRS about a public charity's violating the campaigning prohibition. Currently,
if a person provides information to the IRS helping it detect underpayment of tax or prosecute persons who
violate the Code, that person may be eligible to receive an award of between 15% and 30% of the collected
proceeds. I.R.C. § 7623. Because the intermediate penalty could raise substantial revenue for the
government, a whistleblower award could be a significant amount of money. If whistleblowers were so
incentivized, the IRS would be largely relieved of the duty to look for violations, and instead could focus
all of its efforts on enforcing the intermediate penalty.
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Under the current regime, donors can afford to leave the enforcement to
the IRS. If their preferred charity violates the campaigning prohibition and
loses its exemption, donors can still deduct donations they made before the
loss and can shift their future giving to other public charities.197 If their
charitable deductions are at risk, however, donors have an incentive to watch
the activities of public charities in which they invest and to encourage the
public charities to avoid any campaigning.
Moreover, public charities would have an incentive to comply with their
donors' wishes in this regard, and therefore to avoid campaigning. While there
is no consensus on the sensitivity of donors to the charitable deduction,
economists generally agree that the charitable deduction has increased
charitable donations.198 In order to maintain their donor base, a well-advised
public charity would not only want to comply with the prohibition, but to
establish procedures whereby it could assure current and future donors that it
would continue to comply with the prohibition.
Imposition of the proposed intermediate penalty would increase the IRS's
willingness and ability to enforce the prohibition on campaigning. Moreover,
it would align the interests of donors and of public charities in seeing that
public charities complied with the prohibition. Finally, it would reduce the
enforcement burden on the IRS by drafting donors into ensuring that the public
charities to which they donated complied fully with the prohibition, leaving
the IRS to focus on enforcing the revenue-raising provisions that it is best
suited to enforce.199

197. Currently, when the IRS revokes a public charity's tax exemption, it announces the revocation
in a private letter ruling. The private letter ruling informs the public charity that it will no longer be exempt
from taxes as ofa certain date and that donations to the public charity will no longer be deductible as of that
date. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2010-29-041 (Apr. 23, 2010) ("Contributions to your organization are
no longer deductible under section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code"); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2010-29-033
(Apr. 14, 2010) ("Contributions to your organization are no longer deductible under IRC section 170 after
January 1, 20XX."); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2010-23-061 (Mar. 9,2010) ("Contributions to your organization
are no longer deductible under IRC § 170 after January 1, 20XX.").
198. See Aprill, supranote 35, at 857. Toward the high end ofestimates oftaxpayer sensitivity, some
studies suggest that increasing the cost of giving by 10% (e.g., by reducing the charitable deduction)
decreases charitable contributions by at least 10%. Evelyn Brody & Joseph J. Cordes, Tax Treatment of
Nonprofit Organizations:A Two-EdgedSword, in NONPROFITS AND GOVERNMENT: COLLABORATION AND
CONFLICT 141, 146 (Elizabeth T. Boris & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 1999). On the low end, other studies
suggest that increasing the cost of giving by 10% only reduces giving by 5%. Id
199. An alternative to this proposal that would also ease the burden on the IRS would be to permit
private enforcement of the prohibition. Under this model, private parties could "bring qui tam lawsuits for
purported tax violations." Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Cooperative Tax Regulation, 41 CONN. L. REv. 431, 460
(2008). Whatever the benefits of private enforcement, though, it seems a poor fit for enforcing the
prohibition on campaigning. On the one hand, under current law, the so-called whistleblower statute, I.R.C.
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3. Ancillary Design Issues
The enactment of the proposed intermediate penalty would impose some
additional administrative burden on public charities. As discussed, it would
require public charities to implement procedures that would signal to donors
that the public charities would continue to comply with the campaigning
prohibition at least until the end of the current taxable year. In addition, the
intermediate sanctions would likely make fundraising at least marginally more
difficult, to the extent that any potential donor was sufficiently sensitive and
risk-averse that the donor did not want to risk the deductibility of her donation
at all.
The intermediate sanction would also require public charities to collect
and store donor information, including the donors' names, addresses, amounts
donated, and possibly taxpayer identification numbers.20 0 If the IRS were to
impose the intermediate sanction, the public charity would be required to
contact all of its donors from the year to inform them of the percentage of their
donation that was disallowed, as well as transmit that information to the IRS.20'
In order to inform the IRS and its donors, public charities would have to be
able to access this information.
As a practical matter, requiring public charities to collect and store this
information may not impose a significant burden. It appears that many public
charities already maintain donor lists, which they use to raise more money,
both by renting or selling the list to other organizations and by requesting
additional donations from previous donors.202 Existing mailing lists would
§ 7623, incentivizes normal taxpayers to turn in violators by rewarding them with a portion of the taxes
collected. See Ventry, supra, at 460 ("The promise of lucrative bounties increased incentives for private
persons to expose abusive taxpayer behavior, and added risk of detection and prosecution to the compliance
calculus."). It would be difficult to design a financial reward of a magnitude that would encourage
whistleblowers who had actual knowledge of wrongdoing. On the other hand, if the tax law were to provide
for private enforcement of the prohibition, it would have to contain some mechanism to rein in frivolous
suits. See, e.g., James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit CorporationLaw and an Agenda for
Reform, 34 EMORY L.J. 617, 673-74 (1985) ("An expanded use of relator status based on the California
approach would expand and strengthen the attorney general's enforcement efforts, yet it would protect the
charitable organization from frivolous suits brought by a member of the public.").
200. Taxpayer identification numbers would be useful for the IRS as it attempts to match the
information provided by the public charity with the donors' tax returns in order to determine whether donors
reduced their deduction by the mandated amount.
201. See supranote 188 and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., Jon Gertner, The Very, Very PersonalIs the Political,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2004, § 6,
at 43 ("The common practice of nonprofit groups sharing mailing lists with like-minded organizations would
almost certainly provide them with useful information about the charities I favor and the civic groups I'm
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likely contain most of the information that public charities would need in order
to comply with the intermediate penalty.
In addition, the tax law already requires public charities to furnish to the
IRS the names and addresses of "substantial contributors."203 A substantial
contributor is defined as any person who donates more than $5,000, provided
that donation amounts to 2% or more of the total donations. 204 The
intermediate penalty would require public charities to collect the information
from all donors, not just substantial donors, but public charities should already
have a mechanism for collecting personal information from donors.
Moreover, in order for a donor to substantiate her deduction, in general
she needs to get a receipt from the public charity to which she donates.20 5 It
would be possible for public charities to require donors to provide the required
information for the receipt, and to keep a copy of the receipt itself.
It may be that there is a different way for public charities to collect the
required information that would be easier or better for the public charity. But
requiring public charities to collect this information would not present an
unworkable administrative burden; in many instances, it would present a
marginal additional burden at most. Whatever additional administrative burden
the intermediate penalty imposed on public charities would not prevent them
from engaging in their charitable purposes, and the burden to the public
charities would be offset by the benefits from increased compliance with the
campaigning prohibition.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article is neither to attack nor defend the current
prohibition on campaigning by public charities. Congress has chosen to
continue to regulate public charities' political participation through the tax
law, even though the campaigning prohibition's purpose is shrouded in various
and sometimes conflicting justifications, and even though public charities'
compliance suffers from lack of enforcement and well-publicized

affiliated with."); Nora Krug, MARKETING; The More You Give, the More You Get. Just Ask Your
Mailman,N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 18, 2002, at F3 ("[I]f you make a donation, you can expect to receive 4 to 12
letters a year from the group you gave to, thanking you and asking for more. More important, your name
goes out on a list to be bought and exchanged by other groups, which may send solicitation mail at the same
pace, hoping that you will extend your charitable proclivities their way.").
203. I.R.C. § 6033(b)(5). Churches are exempted from this requirement. Id. §6033(a)(3)(A)(i). Still,
there is no reason why they could not be required to collect this information, too.
204. Id. § 507(d)(2)(A).
205. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(a)(1), (b)(1) (as amended in 1996).
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noncompliance by other public charities. Still, in order to prevent public
charities from being too involved in politics, the tax code may be the best
regulatory instrument available. The Supreme Court has held that Congress
may constitutionally deny a tax deduction, even where the act that led to the
denial is constitutionally protected.206 In light of Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission,2 o7 it is possible that the government would not be able
to directly prohibit a public charity from campaigning.208 If that is the case, the
tax law may be the only tool available to regulate public charities' political
activities, which in turn makes finding an appropriate enforcement mechanism
even more important.
Whether or not the tax law is the only viable manner by which to regulate
public charities' political speech, though, the IRS needs tools that will allow
it to enforce the prohibition consistently. And in order to do so, it would help
for the IRS to have a politically acceptable enforcement tool, one that does not
require shutting down a public charity solely because it engages in
campaigning. The intermediate penalty proposed by this Article would give
the IRS just such a tool-a penalty that gently nudges public charities toward
compliance with a prohibition that remains hotly contested, rather than the
hard shove of losing their tax exemptions. Moreover, by virtue of increasing
donors' tax liability, the intermediate penalty would strongly encourage public
charities to comply with the prohibition while, at the same time, giving donors
an incentive to help the IRS enforce the prohibition. The potential revenue
gains would give the IRS additional reasons to enforce the prohibition.
The intermediate penalty would admittedly impose additional burdens on
public charities. They would have to figure out a way to assure donors and
potential donors that they were not going to violate the campaigning
prohibition, they would have to keep additional records, and, if they violated
the prohibition, would have to file additional returns. But none of these

206. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959) ("Petitioners are not being denied a tax
deduction because they engage in constitutionally protected activities, but are simply being required to pay
for those activities entirely out of their own pockets, as everyone else engaging in similar activities is
required to do under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.").
207. 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010) ("The Government may regulate corporate political speech through
disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that speech altogether.").
208. Most of the commentary on Citizens Unitedhas revolved around the consequences for for-profit
corporations. See, e.g., Griff Palmer, Decision Could Allow Anonymous Political Contributions by
Businesses, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 28,2010, atA25. However, Citizens United itselfis a non-profit corporation,
exempt from taxation under § 501(c)(4). Richard M. Esenberg, The Lonely Death of Public Campaign
Financing,33 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 283, 314 (2010).
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burdens is excessive and, because the intermediate penalty would increase
compliance at a low cost, the additional burdens would be justified.
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